14 July 2017

short bit-analysis of a STANAG-4538 HDLn transfer (BW2 bursts)


Each HDLn transfer consists of n TX Frames (n = 24, 12, 6, or 3) each consisting of n data packets; each data packet consists of 233-byte data segment plus a 17-bit Sequence Number. Each TX Frame is sent using burst waveform BW2.
During the construction of BW2, a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) value is computed across the 1881 payload data bits of each data packet (233 bytes of user data, plus the 17-bit of Sequence Number) and is then appended to the data packet. Then, seven encoder flush bits with values of zero (Flush) are appended to produce an Extended Data packet of 1920 bit length,ie: 233 data bytes + 7 overhead bytes (17-bit sequence number + 32-bit CRC + 7-bit flush). See this post about the formation of a BW2 burst.

Fig. 1 - BW2 formation
That said, we can go back to the original datagram by inspecting the last 56 bits of the Extended Data packets in the two BW2 bursts (Fig. 2a).
The value of the Packet Number fields varies from 0 to 5, this means that it's a 2 x HDL6 transfer; looking carefully at CRC fields we note that the two HDL6 bursts carry exactly the same datagram: maybe the destination station requested a retransmission (the first BW1 ACK burst) or the datagram is sent twice so to improve the reliability of the transfer (Fig. 2a):

Fig. 2a
That said, we can focus on the Extended Data packets (below termed only "packets") of a single BW2 burst (Fig. 2b).
The values of the six Packet Number fields are: 0,1,2,3,0,1. If TxDatagram buffer is not completely emptied the remaining packet positions are filled with repetitions of packets already residing in other positions of TxFrame buffer. The HDL transmitter is at liberty to select packets from the current datagram to repeat as it pleases (the HDL receiver shall inspect the sequence number of each packet received without errors,and use this information to discard duplicate packets).
The original datagram, in this sample, is then composed of the packets #0 #1 #2 #3.

Fig. 2b
Looking at the Packet Byte Count fields in the first four packets (Fig. 2c) we see that the firts three packets carry 233 bytes of user data (as expected, since HDL) and the last packet carries 224 bytes of user data (the remaining 9 bytes are filled with "0" value bytes).
Thus, the length of the original datagram is (233 x 3 ) + 224 = 923 bytes. 

Fig. 2c
Back to the whole bitstream, once structured in a 1920-bit period (the Extended Data packet length), the original datagram can be extracted by isolating the firts 4 rows and removing the overhead bytes: the resulting is an HARRIS "Citadel" encrypted file of 923 bytes length (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3
The duplicated HDL6 burst (A,B), the retransmitted packets (C,D) and the "0" value bytes filling a single packet can be noted looking at the whole bitstream in Figure 4. 
Please note as the bitstream is misleading: at a superficial glance, one could think to four "Citadel" encrypted files!

Fig. 4

13 July 2017

a burst ARQ mixed system (MS110 & S4539)

transmission was spotted only once on 7906.0 KHz from 0603 UTC (tune time) until 0639 (signal off). It's a burst ARQ system in which one station uses STANAG-4539 and the other one uses MIL 188-110A, both running at fixed data rates (respectively4800 and 2400 bps) and carrying STANAG-5066 frames. 
Difficult to say who sends data and who send ACKs. Only the Stanag-4539 bursts have a relative good quality for their analysis (Figs. 1,2): these bursts in large part carry STANAG-5066 DTS control frames (D_PDU type 6) so the station that uses 188-110A could be the data sender, although their duration is very short. Most likely it's a test transmission.

Fig. 1 - frame structure of STANAG-4539 bursts
Fig. 2 - 287 symbols period of STANAG-4539 bursts
Since the different framings of MS110A and S4539, the two stations could use a "special" adhoc configuration or a sort of two-demodulation requirement so to discriminate the incoming signals.

It's worth noting that in many D_PDUs (S4539 bursts) the address of the destination node belongs to the block assigned to France (006.014.yyy.zzz) while the source address belongs to a reserved block (015.xxx.yyy.zzz).

Fig. 3

7 July 2017

STANAG-4538, optimized Asynchronous FLSU call ?

I copied these 3G-HF transmissions very often and, since the "extended" duration of the first burst, I always thinked to Asynchronous FLSU calls; but, apart from the un-expected ending BW5 burst, a careful examination of the first burst in some cases may reserve an interesting aspect as in the present sample.

Asynchronous FLSU calls consist of a sequence of Async_FLSU_Req PDUs sent consecutively on the channel: FLSU protocol use burst waveform 5 so an Async FLSU call can be easily detected in the ACF output screen just thanks to the BW5 spikes (Figs. 1,2).

Fig. 1 - BW5 timing
Fig. 2 - ACF output of an asynchronous FLSU request
Analyzing the recording in question, my analysis tool reveals only one initial BW5 burst, instead of the expected n-bursts (!), which is then followed by a block consisting of 2400Bd PSK-8 modulated symbols. I had a look at the on-air symbols and found that they have a 768-bit period length which corresponds to 256 PSK-8 symbols (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3
BW5 uses a Psuedo Noise spreading sequence that is generated using a table that just contains 256 values [S-4538 #13.9.6] thus the whole first burst match the BW5 waveform (also note the repeated patterns that characterize the bitstream).

Looking at the BW5 timing (Figure 1) and the ACF output screen of the signal (Fig. 4), it seems that the TLC (Transmit Level Control) section is sent only in the first BW5 burst while the following bursts are a bit shorter and consist only of the preamble and data sections, as shown in Figure 5.

Fig. 4
Fig. 5 - the Async FLSU request in question
This is in contrast with what I seen so far in Async FLSU requests in which the BW5 bursts are contiguously transmitted, each with its own TLC section (Figs. 2,6) 
Fig. 6 - ASsync FLSU request as depicted in STANAG-4538
Indeed, STANAG-4538 does not specify this point "The Asynchronous call begins with the LBT (for at least one dwell period), followed by the transmission of about 1.35N Async_FLSU_Request PDUs on the requested link frequency, where N is the number of channels in the scan list, and 1.35 is the duration of each dwell (in seconds)." [STANAG-4538 #5.1.3].

The initial TLC section is used for transmitter level control and receiver AGC settling [1], thus sending TLC sections in contiguous BWn bursts make a poor sense: it's my guess that probably the removal of the redundant TLCs is an optimized implementation adopted by this manufacturer.
By the way, my analysis tool fails because most likely uses a burst-duration approach in order to identify the waveform.

[1] Johnson, Koski, Furman, Jorgenson, "Third Generation and Wideband HF Radio Communications"
Existing HF radios were generally not designed with burst waveforms in mind. For example, MIL-STD- 188-141 military radios are allowed 25 ms to reach full transmit power after keying. While the transmitter radio frequency stages are ramping up, the input audio signal level is adjusted by a transmit level control (TLC) loop so that it fully modulates the transmit power. At the receiver, an automatic gain control (AGC) loop must also adjust to a new receive signal. To accommodate these characteristics of existing radios, the 3G burst waveforms begin with a TLC section of “throwaway” 8-ary PSK symbols that are passed through the system while the transmitter’s and receiver’s level control loops stabilize. 

5 July 2017

unid STANAG-5066 RCOP/UDOP client, Swedish Army (update-1)

[ previous post ]
A recent copy of S-5066 transmissions exhibits a change of paradigm in the so-termed "wrapper" protocol (depicted in the previous post), more precisely the content length of the header Timestamp is reduced from 10 to 9 bytes: 

Fig. 1
Most likely the change happened in coincidence with the reset of the timestamp, ie on 2 July 00:00:00 UTC as can be deduced from a simple calculation (time and date of reception has been taken as the starting date!) and the exposed timestamp (296595868):

Fig. 2
Other than a RCOP new transfer (the above copies regard UDOP protocol), we have also to wait for a capture of a multi-block transmissions to verify if the MTU too is changed.
Note that the copied transmission also offers the opportunity to see the new magic string "ZXPBG", so far never encountered.

For what concerns the source/destination IDs, I could find a possible clue about "HWK01".
Sweden Air Defense Regiment has two air defence battalions equipped with Robotsystem 70 (RBS 70) and Robotsystem 97 (RBS 97): 
Recently, defence and security company SAAB has signed a contract with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) for a service life extension of the RBS 97 air defence missile system, this order ensures the continuing effectiveness of a missile system that is the backbone of Sweden's two air defence battalions:
The RBS 97 is a surface-to-air missile system that is better known as "HAWK", then  it could be that HWK01 = HAWK 01 = Air Defence Battalion 1.

(to be continued)

1 July 2017


08195.0: BU4: Roumenian Police Bucuresti #4, ROU 0624 USB MIL 188-141A handshake 1PY followed by MIL 188-110A (30Jun17) (AAI)
07665.0: ---: Unid 0605 USB 3G-HF FLSU 2-way handshake followed by LDL128 transfer of 451 bytes Citadel encrypted msg (30Jun17) (AAI)
11421.0: ---: Unid prob. V22 Chinese Intel/Diplo 1520 BPSK 62.5 Bd, 9-bit ACF (29Jun17) (AAI)
06358.5: XSA: GBR-DHFCS, U 1517 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (29Jun17) (AAI)
08303.0: IDR: Italian Navy S.Rosa Rome, I 0824 J3E/USB working ASV, STANAG-4285 600bps/L KG-84 encrypton (29Jun17) (AAI)
07561.5: ---: Unid 0809 USB USB MIL 188-141A handshake in Linking Protection mode followed by MIL 188-110A (29Jun17) (AAI)
07559.0: ---: Unid 0715 USB 3G-HF FLSU 2-way handshake followed by LDL320 transfer of 591 bytes Citadel encrypted msg (29Jun17) (AAI)
07840.0: RD21: Algerian Military, ALG 0623 USB MIL 188-141A call NX20 (29Jun17) (AAI)
11130.0: X44: Moroccan Army, MRC 0535 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (29Jun17) (AAI)
08025.0: 1PYC3: Roumenian Police, ROU 0630 USB MIL 188-141A call GALc3 (28Jun17) (AAI)
07899.0: XS72: Unid 0610 USB MIL 188-141A call XN40 (28Jun17) (AAI)
07899.0: XS72: Unid 0556 USB MIL 188-141A handshake XS69 followed by unid vocoder/scrambler (28Jun17) (AAI)
11050.0: AI1: Unid 0845 USB MIL 188-141A call RE1 (25Jun17) (AAI)
11050.0: AI1: Unid 0842 USB MIL 188-141A call RF1 (25Jun17) (AAI)
10958.0: ---: Unid 1359 USB 3G-HF 1-way FLSU request followed by MDL/LDL288 transfer of 563 Citadel encrypted msg (24Jun17) (AAI)
11050.0: AI1: Unid 1313 USB MIL 188-141A handshake XV1 followed by MIL 188-110A serial (23Jun17) (AAI)
11250.0: MATHILDE: Unid French Air Force asset, F 0935 USB MIL 188-141A LQA Exchange w/EVI same QRGs as 0935 log (23Jun17) (AAI)
11250.0: EVI: French Air Force Istres, F 0935 USB MIL 188-141A call MATHILDE, repeated on 11187,11214, 11217, 11235,11250, and 11253. -80dB in JN52 (23Jun17) (AAI)
08218.0: ---: Unid 0716 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by LDL32 transfer of 139 Citadel encrypted msg (23Jun17) (AAI)
08350.0: ---: Unid 0711 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU LQA exchange (23Jun17) (AAI)
06255.7: HWK01: Swedish Armed Forces, S 0647 USB 3G-HF 1-way FLSU call followed by MIL 188-110A Circuit Mode carrying unid S-5066 UDOP client (23Jun17) (AAI)
10170.0: ---: Russian Mil/Gov, RUS 0540 CIS-VFT/3x100Bd/1440Hz (23Jun17) (AAI)
11111.0: 1OMFUM: French Navy OMAR Net, Papeete OCE 0455 USB MIL 188-141A call 1OMFUJ French Navy OMAR Net, Noumea NCL  (23Jun17) (AAI)
07500.0: SZ1: Unid 1245 USB MIL 188-141A call ND1 (21Jun17) (AAI)
07505.8: XLA: French Armed Forces, F 0632 USB MIL 188-141A handshake XLB followed THALES HFXL modem running on 12 channels (21Jun17) (AAI)
10330.0: 920007: Unid 2126 USB MIL 188-141A call 920001 (20Jun17) (AAI)
10425.0: SWI: Unid 2050 USB MIL 188-141A call SDS (20Jun17) (AAI)
10915.0: 105004: Unid 2034 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (20Jun17) (AAI)
10914.5: GWD111: Brasilian Navy unid vessel, B 2029 USB MIL 188-141A call GWPWZ33 (20Jun17) (AAI)
10390.0: 1304: Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC 2020 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (20Jun17) (AAI)
11340.0: 400001: Unid Mauretanian net, MTN 2015 USB MIL 188-141A call 400010 (20Jun17) (AAI)
11010.0: GWPWZ33: Brasilian Navy HQ Rio de Janeiro, B 2009 USB MIL 188-141A call GWPWSP Almirante Sabóia – G25 (20Jun17) (AAI)
06903.0: WI3 Polish Military, POL 0629 USB MIL 188-141A call AV5 (20Jun17) (AAI)
06903.0: TO9 Polish Military, POL 0626 USB MIL 188-141A call HU1 (20Jun17) (AAI)
06903.0: RO2 Polish Military, POL 0626 USB MIL 188-141A call AV5 (20Jun17) (AAI)
10390.0: 1325: Moroccan Civil Protection, MRC 2212 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (19Jun17) (AAI)
06906.0: 5003: Unid 0537 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (19Jun17) (AAI)
05731.0: E06: Russian Intel, RUS 2132 J3E/USB male voice repeating 315 then into 5FGs (16Jun17) (AAI)
08118.5: D02: Dutch Military, HOL 0754 USB MIL 188-141A call D12 (14Jun17) (AAI)
10900.0: VIR: Unid 0720 USB MIL 188-141A LQA exchange w/ PAA (14Jun17) (AAI)
11186.0: ---: Unid 0715 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL3 transfer (14Jun17) (AAI)
11002.0: VIR: Unid 0710 USB MIL 188-141A LQA exchange w/ PAA (14Jun17) (AAI)
07457.0: ---: Unid 0624 USB MIL 188-110 Appendix B OFDM 39-tone followed by short Arabic voice comms (14Jun17) (AAI)
08224.0: ---: Unid 0617 USB HARRIS Autolink-I waveform (14Jun17) (AAI)
07860.0: RD21: Algerian Military, ALG 0602 USB MIL 188-141A call NX20 (13Jun17) (AAI)
06956.5: ---: Unid 0504 USB (offset 1500Hz) R&S ALIS 228Bd/170 calling 220 (13Jun17) (AAI)

23 June 2017

the beauty of grayline

188-141A calls copied this morning around 0455 UTC on 11111.0 KHz/USB (Fig. 1). The ALE addresses  belongs to the French Navy naval bases at overseas departments and territories Papeete and Noumea:
1OMFUM French Navy OMAR Net, Papeete OCE
1OMFUJ French Navy OMAR Net, Noumea NC
more than 16000 Km far from my antenna: reception has been possible thanks to a grayline-path (Fig. 2).

Fig. 1 - decoding
Fig. 2 - the grayline at the reception time

It's interesting to note that, at that same time, exploiting the same grayline path I also had a good copy of CHU Ottawa Canada (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3

Grayline observations and predictions can be read at the VOACAP (Voice of America Coverage Analysis Program) site:
as well as a lot of interesting and accurate services about about HF propagation:

French Navy OMAR (Organisation MARitime des transmissions haute fréquence) HF New-Generation program have the task to modernize all the High-Frequency transmissions media of about 80 assets of the Ocean forces of the French Navy, maintaining interoperability with other NATO Navy. The project was committed to Thomson-CSF (now THALES):

21 June 2017

THALES HFXL modem, "SALAMANDRE" tests go on

Likely another "SALAMANDRE" test session for the new Thales HFXL modem spotted this morning on the 7MHz band. This time the modem uses 12 non-contiguous 3 kHz channels from 7505.8 KHz up to 7656.1 KHz (~150 KHz bandwidth). The HF waveform is a modified STANAG-4539 with the extended preamble of 124 symbols added by Thales developers; further info about the modified waveform and the modem, as well as useful links, can be read in this post.

Fig. 1
It's interesting to note in Figure 2 the use of a double 188-141A 2G link setup exchange before the beginning of the HFXL session: the ALE exchanges happen just on the first and last channel of the next HFXL transmission as to negotiate/announce the used band; anyway, the HFXL session starts after the usual 2G 3-way handshake (as in Fig. 1). This initial link setup part is termed by Thales as the "3KHz phase" and it is illustrated in one of their presentations
By the way, the used ALE calls are XLA and XLB and almost surely they stand for (HF)XL modem-A and modem-B and belongs to French Forces network.

Fig. 2
The HFXL modem 12 channels have been tracked using SDR-Console v3 software configured for twelve simultaneous receivers, in this sample all the channels exhibit a PSK-8 modulation at 2400 symbols/sec (Figs. 3,4): the channel #4 is damaged by an adiacente FSK-2 transmission.

Fig. 3
Fig. 4

19 June 2017

unid STANAG-5066 RCOP/UDOP client, Swedish Army "C2" integrator? (tentative)

[updated, 19 June]

As said in the previous post, in all the monitored transmissions the chosen 3G-HF service is the Circuit Mode, and 1200 bps MIL 188-110A is the used traffic waveform. Data are transferred by STANAG-5066 D_PDUs and both the RCOP (Reliable Connection Oriented Protocol) and UDOP (Unreliable Datagram Oriented Protocol) are used as basic end-to-end transport protocols, but so far the client protocol which run over S-5066 has not been yet identified. Me and S4538 (the nickname of a friend of mine) started to analyze these transmissions since several days and below are exposed the tentative results in order to get comments from out there, further posts will follow.

Figure 1 shows two bitstreams after MS-110A removal and after synced on 0xEB90 (S-5066 D_PDU synchronisation sequence): in this cases all the D_PDUs are of type 7 (non-ARQ delivery) and 0 (Simplex data transfer) and carry UDOP and RCOP protocol.

Fig. 1
It's interesting to note in Fig. 2 the initial same structures which are present in all the recordered copies, in both RCOP and UDOP cases, after the removal of the DTS overhead (D_PDU encapsulations):
Fig. 2
 Let's have a look at ASCII rapresentations of a series of decoded transmissions (Fig. 3):

Fig. 3
Data are structured as a series of headers having the format {<length>,<content>}:


A possible explanation could be:

source and destination IDs

number of the current data-block (see later)

total number of data-blocks (see later)

most likely a timestamp (see later)

unknown. So far, never seen something different at this position, probably marks the start of a data block (SOF).

number of bytes followed by data.

So far, never seen something different at this position, probably marks the end of a data block (EOF).

The particular format of the headers {<length>,<content>}, the iteration of the transmissions and their duration, lead to think to a wrapper protocol that acts as a "bridge" to passing data between T-MMH systems (eg X.400 and ACP127 networks, although STANAG-4006 performs that task) or between C2 systems.

By the way, "The Sweidish Army uses C2 systems that are not interoperable and data must be manually transferred between them. Sweden began to integrate all the service's C2 systems, at all levels, in 2005 under the name SWECCIS. [...] Swedish Armed Forces HQ tasked FOA, FMV and FHS to propose a vision for a mobile military joint C2 system for 2010, this project has been expanded to include civilian C2 elements [...] the goal is a single C2 environment..." [1].
But these are only suppositions(!), although some clues come also from this picture [2]

For what concerns the timestamp header, it seems related to the "wrapped" data file. By examining consecutive transmissions, the granularity is in milliseconds and the Epoch Time started on Sat May 13 2017 00:00 CEST (GMT +2): possibly the date on which this "service" came into production?

***  structure of the protocol ***
In the cases depicted in Figure 4a, if the data-block length is greather than 1977 bytes then it is segmented into smaller blocks, each block consisting of the same {<length>,<content>} headers. The timestamp header remains unchanged while the current data-block header is updated.

Fig. 4a
Anyway, the max length of the data-block is not constant but depends on the length of the IDs, or better, on the length of the headers (Fig. 4b):

Fig. 4b
The max length of the data-block varies to match the max length of the transmission-block which appears to be  2051 bytes for both RCOP and UDOP protocols. The data-blocks are not filled if their length is smaller than the one allowed by the transmission block max length.

Why 2051 bytes? The maximum transmission unit (MTU) for S-5066 Subnetwork Interface is 2048 bytes when using point-to-point transmitting mode (ARQ or NON-ARQ), so the clients are responsible for segmenting larger messages into User Protocol Data Units (U_PDUs). The Subnetwork Interface Service will discard any U_PDU submitted by a client where the U_PDU is greater in size than the MTU size, but clients shall accept larger U_PDUs when receiving data. 
Note that we see the U_PDUs plus the 12-byte overhead due to C_PCI, S_PCI, and RCOP/UDOP headers added by S-5066 (Fig. 4c), so - unless null bytes - likely the MTU used by this protocol is 2035-2039 bytes. It's worth noting that the U_PDUs are sent un-segmented and that the Apllication Identifier is 0x8008, that just belongs to the values which are available for user-defined applications (S-5066 Annex F, table F5).
Fig. 4c

The transmsission blocks at the sending S-5066 node are then splitted in un-filled "chunks" of 200 bytes length and sent to S-5066 port (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5

Indeed, looking at the hex rapresentation of an UDOP transmission block (Fig. 6) we see that the 200-byte chunks are sent twice, unless the last chunk and the first chunk of the successives data-blocks. This makes sense to improve the reliability, since the nature of UDOP protocol itself (it's a basic connection-less protocol) and the use of S-5066 non-ARQ service. 


*** nature of the data ***
For what concerns the nature of the data, since the {<length>,<content>} headers  are in plain-text, the encryption if any is performed upstream before this protocol.
A termed here "magic string", in the form  ZLLLL (ie "Z" followed by 4 uppercase letters), appears in the first 40 bytes of the data-block and it is always preceeded by the 34-byte sequence 0x7E0862...61D5EE20 (Fig. 7). In case of a multi-blocks transfer the magic string is present only in the first block ( Fig. 4a). So far, the seen values are: empty, ZXPBC, ZXPBD, ZRTBC, and ZRTBD. This is another unclear point and needs further observations.

The data obtained after the removal of the headers do not exhibit particular structures or recognizable patterns, unless the firts 40 bytes followed by the magic string. 

*** S-5066 HF network ***
For what concerns the HF network, they have tens(!) of channels. Anyway, at least from a monitoring by S4538, each channel is always used with the same RCOP/UDOP protocol.
So far, matching S-5066 addresses and src/dest headers we got:

[006.046.000.zzz] block

[006.046.001.zzz] block

In the vast majority of the cases (almost 99%) traffic is originated from 006.046.000.zzz block nodes (HWK01,ZMK002) to 006.046.001.zzz block nodes. Very few traffic in the reverse direction. Maybe 006.046.000.zzz block is assigned to the main (strategic?) nodes of the net?
Anyway, it's interesting to note that in some transmissions the same ID "HWK01" appear in both the src and dest blocks, although with different S-5066 addresses (anyway belonging to the same block 006.046.000.zzz):

{5,HWK01}{5,HWK01} have the S-5066 addresses and

Perhaps two possible reasons:
a) the ID HWK01 acts like a sort of ZIP-code or global-ID with different users/services, each with a distinct S-5066 Address 
b) these are two physical instances. As shown in [2] they have separated Rx and Tx stations. Maybe this is a information transfer from one Tx to its corresponding Rx station which logically share the same ID.

Helps, comments and recordings are welcome!
(to be continued) 


13 June 2017

(not such) logs

06303.0: ---: Unid 1959 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by LDL32 transfer(09Jun17) (AAI)
06363.2: ---: Unid prob French Navy 0550 USB THALES HF XL modem, likely "SALAMANDRE" tests (09Jun17) (AAI)
06909.0: ABC7: Croatian Military, HRV 0737  USB MIL 188-141A call ABG6 (06Jun17) (AAI)
07401.0: ZBOR: German customs Patrol vessel Borkum, D 0732 USB MIL 188-141A call BMEK (29May17) (AAI)
07498.5: ---: Unid 0600 USB STANAG-4197 modem (31May17) (AAI)
07500.0: AI1: Polish Military, POL 1030 USB MIL 188-141A call SZ1 (28May17) (AAI)
07559.0: ---: Unid 0731 USB 3G-HF Circuit Mode in MIL 188-110A Serial (29May17) (AAI)
07559.0: ---: Unid 0800 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL+ transfer (29May17) (AAI)
07628.0: A98: Unid Chinese net, C 2108 USB MIL 188-141A handshake D78 (07Jun17) (AAI)
07630.0: ---: Unid 0618 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by LDL352 transfer, sending 675-byte Citadel encrypted data (07Jun17) (AAI)
07651.0: ---: Unid 0403 USB 3G-HF FLSU failure (02Jun17) (AAI)
07712.0: ---: Unid 0407 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL12 transfer (02Jun17) (AAI)
07745.0: TBB: Turkish Navy, TUR 0617 STANAG-4285 600bps/L CARBs "//TBB040I(0)/TBB041I(0)/TBB044I(0)/TBB042I(0)/TBB043I(0)/TBB047I(0)/TBB045I(0)/TBB046I(0)/TBB048I(0)/TBB049I(0)/TBB050I(0)//" (31May17) (AAI)
07756.0: ---: Unid NATO stn 0707 ISB LINK-11 SLEW modem (29May17) (AAI)
07761.0: 6007: Unid 2024 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (09Jun17) (AAI)
07788.0: ---: Unid 0823 USB R&S GM2100 modem (06Jun17) (AAI)
07793.0: ---: Unid 0615 USB 3G-HF Circuit Mode in MIL 188-110A Serial (31May17) (AAI)
07803.0: ---: Unid French Forces stn, F 0653 (cf) ARQ-E 184.6Bd/388 modem (29May17) (AAI)
07813.0: J62 Moroccan Military, MRC 0600 USB USB MIL 188-141A sounding (06Jun17) (AAI)
07814.0: ---: Unid 0609 USB 3G-HF Circuit Mode in MIL 188-110A Serial (31May17) (AAI)
07860.0: PC21: Unid (Algerian Military?) 0612 USB MIL 188-141A call NX20 (31May17) (AAI)
07898.0: 049112: German Red Cross, D 2113 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (07Jun17) (AAI)
07899.0: XS72: Unid 0627 USB MIL 188-141A handshake NX40 followed by unid vocoder (06Jun17) (AAI)
07930.0: ---: Unid 0413 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL12 transfer (02Jun17) (AAI)
08000.0: ---: Russian Military, RUS 0747 USB CIS-Makhovik BPSK 1200Bd before CIS-12 (31May17) (AAI)
08005.0: 920: Unid 2103 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (07Jun17) (AAI)
08023.0: BX80: Unid 0713 USB MIL 188-141A call NX80 (03Jun17) (AAI)
08072.0: PEM01D: French Navy, F 0645 USB MIL 188-141A call PEM05D (07Jun17) (AAI)
08151.0: TYMT2: Spanish Police Toledo, E 0628 USB USB MIL 188-141A sounding (07Jun17) (AAI)
08162.0: 035: Hungarian Army, HNG 0712 USB MIL 188-141A handshake 082, female voice comms followed by unid vocoder (10Jun17) (AAI)
08163.0: ---: Unid 0339 USB 3G-HF FLSU failure (02Jun17) (AAI)
08182.0: XGL: Unid UK-DHFCS node 0811 USB MIL 188-141A call XSS (29May17) (AAI)
08218.0: ---: Unid 0614 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL12 transfer (06Jun17) (AAI)
08297.0: ---: Portuguese Air Force, POR 0742 USB STANAG-4197 (03Jun17) (AAI)
08297.0: ---: Portuguese Air Force, POR 1205 USB STANAG-4197 16-tone library only (02Jun17) (AAI)
08327.0: ---: Unid 2016 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL24 transfer (09Jun17) (AAI)
08906.0: ---: Santa Maria, AZR 1953 J3E/USB wkg 9364ER (09Jun17) (AAI)
09018.3: NAVY1: Iraqi Navy HQ, IRQ 1754 USB MIL 188-141A call P103 (10Jun17) (AAI)
09018.3: P102: Iraqi Navy Patrol Boat P103, IRQ 1741 USB MIL 188-141A call NAVY2 Iraqi Navy HQ (10Jun17) (AAI)
09019.0: 220208: GBR-RAF A/c C17A 1730 USB MIL 188-141A call [?] CMD AMD [TAZ RRR6395 REQ TAF EGVN]
"to XSS (TAZ) de RAF flight 6395, request weather for Brize Norton, UK (EGVN)" (10Jun17) (AAI)
09025.0: 220208: GBR-RAF A/c C17A 1727 USB MIL 188-141A call XSS (10Jun17) (AAI)
09272.5: ---: Unid French Forces stn, F 1155 (cf) ARQ-E 184.6Bd/388 modem (29May17) (AAI)
10035.0: K36: Israeli Air Force, ISR 1356 USB MIL 188-141A call AA2 (28May17) (AAI)
10211.6: ---: Polish Intel, POL 0700 FSK 100Bd/620, 96-bit ACF (26May17) (AAI)
10590.5: ---: Swedish Armed Forces, S 0831 3G-HF Circuit Mode in MIL 188-110A Serial carrying STANAG-5066 data (31May17) (AAI)
10627.0: ---: Unid 0740 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL3 transfer (30May17) (AAI)
10638.0: EK9: Greek Military, GRC 0848 USB MIL 188-141A call GEF (29May17) (AAI)
10642.0: AC4: Unid 1730 USB MIL 188-141A call DD3 (29May17) (AAI)
10750.0: HQ4: Unid (presumed Egyptian net)1534 USB MIL 188-141A handshake GANOB5 followed by CLOVER-2000 modem and voice comms in Arabic (29May17) (AAI)
10820.0: ---: Unid 1744 USB 3G-HF Asynchronous FLSU call (29May17) (AAI)
10947.0: CAIRADIO: Unid 1504 USB MIL 188-141A sounding, also on 11300.0 KHz/USB (29May17) (AAI)
10960.0: HWK01: Swedish Armed Forces, S 1124 3G-HF Circuit Mode, MIL 188-110A carrying STANAG-5066 as bearer for unid MMHS (06Jun17) (AAI)
10975.0: 1SR: NATO BALTOPS-2017 Exercise 0650 USB MIL 188-141A call BRO (06Jun17) (AAI)
10994.2: HWK01: Swedish Armed Forces, S 1036 3G-HF Circuit Mode, MIL 188-110A carrying STANAG-5066 as bearer for unid MMHS (06Jun17) (AAI)
11022.0: ---: Israeli Navy 0710 ISRNy-HYBRID Parallel/Serial modem (06Jun17) (AAI)
11050.0: SK1: Unid (Egyptian net ?) 1343 USB MIL 188-141A call SZ1 (30May17) (AAI)
11050.0: SK1: Unid (Egyptian net ?) 1348 USB MIL 188-141A handshake SV1 followed by MIL 188-110A Serial (30May17) (AAI)
11050.0: SK1: Unid (Egyptian net ?) 1354 USB MIL 188-141A handshake XV1 followed by MIL 188-110A Serial (30May17) (AAI)
11112.0: CLC: Unid 1020 USB MIL 188-141A call CLB (11Jun17) (AAI)09018.3: BOT: Iraqi Navy HQ, IRQ 1844 USB MIL 188-141A call P104 (10Jun17) (AAI)
11112.0: CLC: Unid 1045 USB MIL 188-141A call HIC (11Jun17) (AAI)
11112.0: CLC: Unid 1232 USB MIL 188-141A call VIK (11Jun17) (AAI)
11114.5: ---: Unid 0647 USB ARCOTEL MAHRS 2400Bd serial modem (06Jun17) (AAI)
11215.0: 400001: Unid Mauretanian net, MRT 1944 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (09Jun17) (AAI)
11215.0: 400013: Unid Mauretanian Net, MTN 1750 USB MIL 188-141A call 400001 (29May17) (AAI)
11217.0: UKE303: RAF E-3 Awacs 1504 USB MIL 188-141A sounding (30May17) (AAI)
11430.0: ---: Unid 1743 USB 3G-HF 2-way FLSU handshake followed by HDL+ transfer (29May17) (AAI)
12386.0: ---: Unid 1416 Unid BPSK 62.5Bd (BPSK63 HAM) modem, encrypted msg (28May17) (AAI)
13077.1: ---: Unid USB STANAG-4285 600bps/L modem, KG-84 encrypted messages (02Jun17) (AAI)

10 June 2017

STANAG-4539 in multichannel mode: Thales HF XL modem (likely "SALAMANDRE" tests)

This system has been copied on 9 different simultaneous channels from ~6200 to ~6400 KHz on USB during 9 June morning. The analysis reveals it's a STANAG-4539 modem (frame length is 287 PSK-8 symbols) running at different data signaling rates at constant 2400Bd data rate. The system uses bursts and (possibly) ARQ mode. My friend KarapuZ too copied this system but on a different HF segment.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

The decisive contribution for the identification of the signal came from my friend ANgazu: he suggested that these transmissions could be the Thales HFXL modem, since they use up to 16 narrowband channels in 200 Khz bw just using 4539 waveforms. Most likely, the heard transmissions are tests related to the Thales /French MOD contract: PEA "SALAMANDRE".

Indeed, as depicted in Thales presentation of the HFXL modem:
they uses an evolution from the SANAG-4539 frame structure, mainly differing in the preamble parts as shown in Figure 3 

Fig. 3
Other than the long miniproble (32 symbols length rather than 31), they added a third 124 PSK-8 symbols part (termed "Extended") to the S-4539 initial synchronization preamble. The data block length (256 symbols) and the mini probe length (31 symbols) remain unchanged so that the period counts 287 symbols as in S-4539 (Figure 2).
The extended synchronization preamble is specific to  HF XL.  This part, not included when operating according to S-4539 or MS 188-110C ISB modes, is combined with the main preamble to carry all  information  necessary  to  the  HF XL  waveform, in particular information on modulation choice for each channel. Furthermore, a specific redundancy capability is introduced, that ensures resilience to the loss of a channel as long as the number of channels is greater or equal to 3.

A deeper look at the preamble of one heard transmission confirms the Thales HF XL modem, as depicted in Figures 4,5

Fig. 4 - the whole preamble
Fig. 5 - the 124 symbols (51.6 msec) added by Thales
As further confirm, ANgazu measured the parts of the preamble (Fig. 6) and time durations fit perfectly:

Fig. 6 - parts durations in HF XL preamble
A: syncronization preamble (76 ms)
B: initial sync 287 symbols (b1 of 184 and b2 of 103 symbols)
C: extended Thales preamble (124 symbols)

The adaptive wideband HF waveform termed “HF XL” relies on the usage of several non-contiguous 3 kHz channels spread over a 200 kHz wide sub-band.

Fig. 7
Expanding on the high performance of the serial tone modem technology standardized in STANAG 4539 for 3 kHz sideband to conjugate a plurality of channels in a multi narrow band (MNB) waveform, this approach can be seen as an extension of the US MIL-STD-188-110C appendix F “ISB”, with the addition of specific redundancy capabilities to provide resistance to the highly variable HF channel conditions.  As illustrated in Figure 7, these channels do not need to be contiguous, which allows to select only good quality and authorized channels. A 4G ALE alternate proposte ?
(continue in this post)

Thanks to ANgazu for the identification and collaboration.